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Abstract 
Climate change policy cannot be the first priority of the EU for the immediate future. However, in spite 
of the corona-crisis the urgency of climate change mitigation has not disappeared. The post-corona 
recovery can both put the EU’s decarbonisation progress back on track – after low-carbon investments 
will inevitably take a hit – but the EU’s Green Deal proposals can likewise support the general economic 
recovery. It will be important to ensure that recovery measures are compatible with global climate 
change and European Green Deal priorities so that stimulus money will flow to economic activities that 
have a place in a climate-neutral world. As time passes, the re-launch may actually offer a unique 
opportunity for the EU to live up to the Green Deal’s promise of economic modernisation along the Paris 
decarbonisation objectives. The period we have until the relaunch should be used to develop a new 
agenda. These ideas will not per se be off-the-shelf but go beyond current solutions for decarbonisation. 
Instead of tinkering around the margins, the EU should focus on transformational technologies, and for 
example go big on low-carbon infrastructure, efficient buildings, and lead markets to boost demand for 
climate-neutral industry. 
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he coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) crisis is first and foremost a public health crisis. 
Policymakers should focus on resolving it with the greatest possible urgency. However, 
when the European economies finally enter the phase of recovery, the urgency of 
mitigating climate change will not have dissipated. There is a risk that neglect of climate action 
during the recovery will deal a heavy blow to efforts to ‘bend the curve’ of greenhouse gas 
emissions in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. 
Already today, some member states have called for climate measures to be scrapped. The 
Polish deputy minister for state assets Kowalski suggested1 the EU ETS should be discontinued 
from next year onwards while the Czech prime minister Babiš called for scrapping the Green 
Deal. The first vice-president of the Romanian ruling party likewise asked all Romanian MEPs to 
support the abandonment of the Green Deal and the diversion of funds for supporting national 
economies and health systems. Those calls – and similar suggestions to scrap existing climate 
policies and strategies wholesale – are misplaced: climate change will neither disappear nor be 
resolved because of the coronavirus.  
Climate policy may no longer be the first priority of the EU, but to re-embark on a high-carbon 
future development pathway should not be seen as a viable economic strategy for exiting the 
crisis. However, it is also too early to draw conclusions on the actual economic implications. 
Therefore, it may be wise to postpone new decisions, such as an increase in the emissions 
reductions target for 2030 to 50-55%. Far-reaching decisions are best taken once the full 
implications of the crisis are known, not least because impact assessments are challenging 
when uncertainty is high. Some upping of the 2030 target – if politically and economically 
feasible – would certainly be helpful. The twenty years that remain between 2030 and 2050 to 
reach climate-neutrality (as firmly endorsed by the European Council) will be very challenging 
from a decarbonisation perspective as it will involve the hard-to-abate sectors. Nevertheless, 
an increase in the 2030 target would mean a proportionately less steep emissions reduction 
pathway beyond 2030.  
The European Commission rightly rebutted2 the notion that the public health crisis should lead 
to the EU Climate Law proposal being scrapped. The proposed Climate Law, which would 
embed the EU’s climate-neutrality target for 2050 into EU legislation, is aimed precisely at 
shielding the “generational challenge of climate change” from more pressing and immediate 
priorities. Indeed, the Climate Law has the potential to strengthen EU climate policy 
governance, which is likely to be indispensable for reaching EU climate objectives. However, in 
the context of the current crisis, the European Commission may face difficulties in obtaining its 
desired powers to amend climate trajectories by delegated acts as envisaged in the Climate 
Law. The suggestions by Poland, Czechia and Romania to slow down climate ambitions may 
point towards the potential challenges the Commission could face in managing energy and 
 
1 https://www.euractiv.com/section/emissions-trading-scheme/news/eu-should-scrap-emissions-trading-scheme-
polish-official-says/ 
2 See e.g. https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147815 
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climate policy through National Energy and Climate Plans in the absence of binding national 
targets.  
Short-term implications  
In the short-term, emissions will decline, likely significantly. As a comparison, in 2009 in the 
midst of the financial crisis, total EU GHG emissions decreased by 376 MTCO2e. Based on the 
duration of restrictions imposed by governments and the magnitude of the consequent 
economic contraction, there may be a greater effect in 2020 than in 2009: total EU GHG 
emissions3 might decrease by between 250 and 450 mega-tonnes of CO2e4 compared to 2019. 
ENTSO-E data already reveals a decline in electricity consumption in most EU countries, 
especially in those most affected by the coronavirus outbreak, such as Italy and Spain. Based 
on the merit order of electricity markets, this will result, to a significant extent, in lower levels 
of electricity generation from fossil fuels, especially lignite and hard coal.  
Recent data released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China5 for the months of January 
and February also give an indication of the scale of the coronavirus impact on economic activity, 
with industrial production having shrunk by 13.5%. The transport sector will be among the 
hardest hit by the efforts to limit the spread of the virus, with personal transport and aviation 
showing the most significant slowdowns. Moreover, a mild winter has already caused a 
reduction in energy demand in January and February compared to 2019 and a consequent 
decline in emissions.  
This effect, however, will likely be short-lived. EU ETS emissions6 declined by nearly 10% 
between 2008 and 2009, before rebounding by 2013. After the Eurozone crisis of 2015, 
emissions have been declining gradually while economic growth recovered, driven by electricity 
sector abatement (see figure 1). 
Since the onset of the corona crisis, the price of allowances has dropped by over a third from 
around €25 to €16, reflecting the fall in financial markets in general. In contrast to other carbon 
pricing methods, such as a carbon tax, the ETS as a cap-and-trade system is anticyclical. As 
economic activity and allowance demand go down, so does the ETS price, thereby preventing 
the ETS becoming an additional burden to carbon-intensive sectors. 
 
 
3 EU27 + UK. 
4 The estimations are based on the decrease of electricity production reported by ENTSO-E, the recent set of 
statistics released by the Chinese Government on economic activity in January and February, as well as some 
assumptions made for a similar calculation conducted for Germany by Agora Energiewende (2020). The 
estimations vary according to the assumptions made about the duration and extent of restrictions imposed by EU 
governments. 
5 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/202003/t20200316_1732233.html 
6 ETS emissions for 2019 (to be confirmed in April 2020) are expected to be around 1.6 billion tonnes. 
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Figure 1. EU ETS emissions 2008-20197 
 
Source: EU Transaction Log. 
 
The intuition in ‘normal’ times would be to be concerned about lower carbon prices. With 
emissions declining, and many companies under stress from the economic shock, lower carbon 
prices should not be a short-term concern. Some companies may sell allowances to raise cash 
in the short term. The Market Stability Reserve will reduce future auction volumes if the 
allowance surplus increases in the short term. Moreover, if the surplus increases, the number 
of allowances that will be invalidated from 2023 onwards will likewise increase.8 In the recovery 
phase, the planned review of the Market Stability Reserve or proposals such as a carbon price 
floor can be revisited to ensure that the carbon price signal is strengthened when output levels 
increase again.  
When this happens, guiding economic output towards lower-carbon activities will be key. In 
the 2008 financial crisis, energy efficiency and emissions reductions were not a main priority in 
the recovery phase. For example, the €200 billion European Economic Recovery Programme 
reserved only 2% for climate and energy spending.9 Together with depressed private 
investment, older and more inefficient production facilities may run for longer. Both will be 
negative for emissions trends.  
 
7 Value for 2019 is based on an estimate. Please note truncated y-axis. 
8 For more detail on how the Market Stability Reserve leads to automatic invalidation of surplus allowances, see: 
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/strong-revision-eu-ets-future-may-bring-impetus-further-reform/ 
9 https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/article13502_en.htm 
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There is a risk that coal bail-out measures will ‘artificially’ extend the operation of already 
uneconomic coal, which for example is the case in Romania. This will crowd out renewable or 
less carbon-intensive sources such as natural gas, delaying the transition and make it more 
expensive in the future. Lower ETS prices are most likely to affect coal generation, both during 
the slowdown and recovery.  
Should restrictive measures last for a long period, e.g. months, it could become more difficult 
to operate the EU ETS. For example, the extensive system of monitoring, reporting and 
verification of emissions includes site visits by regulatory authorities and other enlisted service 
providers. Just as for some businesses, certain member states are considering deferring tax 
payments, the compliance dates for the ETS could and in such extreme circumstances most 
likely will be extended.10  
In a recession, there might still be pressure to relieve industry from carbon costs, beyond the 
anti-cyclical effect of the ETS. There may be calls for reverting to free allocation of allowances, 
instead of auctioning. However, as we have learned from the past, this would generate windfall 
profits in the power sector, which would pass on the market value of allowances to customers, 
as it did from 2005 to 2012 when it received its emissions certificates for free. This occurs 
because companies could always sell the freely allocated allowances on the market instead of 
using them for compliance. When the cost of allowances is passed through, consumers (who 
may be worried about electricity bills) or electro-intensive industries still face carbon costs. 
Energy-intensive industry already receives a large majority of allowances for free, in addition 
to reduced or exempted grid fees, renewable levies and compensation for indirect carbon costs 
related to electricity price increases.  
With new ETS rules coming into effect in 2021, the free allocation volumes to industrial 
installations will also be updated more quickly if there are changes in production levels. This 
should help prevent supply-demand imbalances in the EU ETS to accumulate to the same extent 
as happened in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis.  
The aviation sector, which is being hit very hard, will experience reduced demand for EU 
allowances, further contributing to lower ETS prices. Outside of the EU ETS, transport sector 
emissions will be down as a result of personal transport being curtailed and lower economic 
activity. Energy-use in buildings may increase in the residential sector but decrease elsewhere. 
This may make it easier for member states to reach emissions reduction targets under the Effort 
Sharing framework. 
Meeting targets easily might not make the case for renewables and energy efficiency. 2020 is 
a target year for both member states and the EU as a whole. For renewables in particular, 
sustained lockdowns and the liquidity and capital constraints this brings may slow down 
deployment. Limited capacity for local governments may add to this. While potentially missing 
 
10 A first indication of this is a statement by the German emissions trading authority: 
https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/mailing/EN/2020/2020-03-20_corona.html 
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targets may not be a significant political problem in light of the crisis, it may nevertheless have 
legal implications as the European Commission is required to enforce EU Directives. 
The agricultural sector is mainly supported through the common agricultural policy, which can 
play a major role both in greening agriculture as well as in supporting the sector throughout 
the crisis. Its strategic importance for food security is elevated for as long as global borders are 
fragmented, although EU coordination should ensure that cargo and trade in goods continues 
without disruption. 
Finance 
Public and private finances alike will be under stress, but the former should find fewer 
constraints. The stability and growth pact’s escape clause11 for exceptional circumstances has 
been activated and will not be a constraint on any fiscal expenditure. The key finance element 
for climate change will be the low-carbon conditionality of public support.  
Size of the budget 
EU GDP will nevertheless take a hit. This will have knock-on effects for any funding that is based 
on shares of GDP. If the member states impose ceilings as a percentage of GDP, the financial 
size of the EU budget will have to be revised to account for the downturn, curtailing the budget. 
Revisions of EU budget ceilings based on inflation and growth are a normal practice, often not 
questioned when GDP grows beyond initial estimations, but controversial in a recession.  
In addition, the contributions to the EU budget suffer from a statistical time lag. A reduction in 
contributions only takes effect in practice one to two years later than the contraction, as final 
GDP estimations are released, meaning that lower contributions are not aligned to the period 
of impact on national treasuries. With the negotiations ongoing for the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework, the polarisation of the opinions will increase, with SARS-CoV-2 impact 
being used as a strong argument to reduce the budget by some member states (mainly net 
contributors), and conversely as a proof that more common action and finance is needed by 
other member states (mainly net beneficiaries).  
If the EU budget is curtailed, it can have adverse consequences for climate-related investment 
and innovation funding. With some countries very reticent about reducing pre-allocated 
agricultural and cohesion support, cuts would disproportionally fall in the non-reallocated lines, 
such as the Connecting Europe Facility, research and innovation programmes (e.g. Horizon 
Europe) or security and defence, exactly those areas where real EU value added is created and 
where common action is essential.  
Funding generated by monetising ETS allowances could also decline if the ETS price does not 
recover. E.g. the ETS Innovation Fund which will be formed by selling 450 million allowances is 
 
11 This escape clause was formally activated on 23 March 2020. 
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worth over €3 billion less at today’s carbon prices compared with the estimated value at the 
beginning of the year. 
Potential asymmetries and regional impacts 
As the economic impacts and responses may turn asymmetric between member states and 
regions, the impact on funding instruments based on relative GDP per capita (e.g. Cohesion 
Funds) may become out of step with new economic realities. For example, the eligibility for the 
Modernisation Fund,12 moreover, is based on relative GDP per capita in 2013. Due to the 
economic shock, some member states may have become (in)eligible if the calculations were 
updated for 2020. This may create political pressure to update eligibility criteria, which in return 
might open up many more discussions. This happened with Greece: due to the impact of the 
2015 Eurozone crisis, its relative GDP dropped below 60% of the EU average after the initial 
rules of the Modernisation Fund had been proposed. This was later addressed in the ETS 
legislation.  
State aid could be practically unlimited for the foreseeable future. The EU Treaties explicitly 
allows state aid to make good damages in “exceptional occurrences”.13 The other justification 
clauses to remedy serious economic disturbances and to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities also apply, as outlined in a State Aid Communication on the crisis.14 
Notification of state aid is still required. Member states should be able to respond to the 
immediate health crisis without constraints imposed by the state aid framework. In the 
recovery phase, however, the notification and approval process could be pivotal in guiding 
member state investment towards lower-carbon infrastructure and production. 
The social and industrial dimensions of the Green Deal will be elevated in importance. In the 
short-term, protecting incomes should be prioritised. In the recovery phase, member states 
should consider what jobs in carbon-intensive economic activities are precarious and whether 
the focus should be on jobs as such or on the sectors in which they are located. The industrial 
strategy of the EU, released while the virus outbreak accelerated, would have to remain 
coherent with the Green Deal. This will be even more true post-crisis due to the large-scale 
fiscal policy interventions foreseen. Likewise, initiatives such as the ‘coal regions in transition’ 
can play an important role as conduits for the recovery and to ensure that this recovery will be 
‘future-proof’. 
  
 
12 https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-opportunities-of-the-modernisation-fund-for-the-energy-
transition-in-central-and-eastern-europe/ 
13 Art 107(2b) TFEU. 
14 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/sa_covid19_temporary-framework.pdf 
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The longer term  
For the less immediate future, it will be important to ensure that the economic recovery and 
stimulus measures are compatible with EU and global climate change and Green Deal priorities. 
For example, any bailouts, subsidies, or other forms of sustained fiscal support to carbon-
intensive economic activities should be checked against possibilities to invest in climate-neutral 
production, processes and operation. Contrary to how it is sometimes presented, the Green 
Deal is not there to impose extra restrictions on carbon-intensive activities, but instead meant 
to be a pillar of the EU economic growth and modernisation strategy, as for example been 
outlined in the November 2018 European Commission Long-Term Strategy.15  
Climate-neutral energy infrastructure is one area where investment could particularly make a 
difference. Electricity grids need to deal with higher shares of renewables in the future, carbon 
capture and storage infrastructure allows energy-intensive industries to reduce hard-to-abate 
emissions, and hydrogen should be transported from where it can be produced in a carbon-
neutral way to where it can help sectors decarbonise.  
Likewise, the Green Deal’s focus on renovating buildings and addressing energy-use requires 
massive investment and policy attention of national and local authorities. There is an 
opportunity to focus on the carbon content of infrastructures or in buildings, e.g. steel, cement, 
copper, aluminium and other materials, the value chain of which is responsible for 50% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.16 The introduction of carbon content rules in post-crisis recovery 
measures can provide an opportunity for governments to restore long-term climate objectives 
in economic activity. Lead markets for climate-neutral products to bring down costs can play 
an important role here.17 This can include green public procurement,18 carbon contracts for 
differences19 or industrial public-private partnerships. 
The reason for including climate and decarbonisation during the recovery is not to 
opportunistically jump on board any fiscal stimulus that may be available. As the crisis will 
invariably make some investments more difficult, securing Green Deal priorities in the recovery 
programmes will be essential to ensure that the EU’s climate action will not be undermined 
after the crisis. 
While it may be understandable that all options, including a radical break with existing policies, 
are on the table during an unprecedented crisis, the corona crisis represents an exogenous 
 
15 European Commission (2018) – Communication: A Clean Planet For All. 
16 OECD (2018), ‘’Global Material Resources Outlook to 2060 - Economic drivers and environmental 
consequences’’.  
17 https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/tools-boost-investment-low-carbon-technologies/ 
18 See the forthcoming paper by CEPS on Green Public Procurement. 
19https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Etude/201910-ST0619-
CCfDs_0.pdf 
THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL AFTER CORONA: IMPLICATIONS FOR EU CLIMATE POLICY | 9 
 
symmetric shock20 to the whole EU and its neighbouring countries (even if demographics and 
response measures may create asymmetries later). The most critical economic and fiscal policy 
interventions will be to provide liquidity, protect incomes and to keep businesses afloat. Carbon 
costs, or other regulations more generally, are and will not be a driver of this crisis. 
Policymakers may face a choice in whether the emphasis of the EU policy response will be on 
carbon pricing through the ETS, or on more demand-side industrial policy measures such as 
lead markets. When fiscal resources are scarce, the former may seem more attractive.21 On the 
other hand, the political economy of strengthening carbon pricing may become more 
challenging. Carbon pricing concentrates the costs of climate policy in a small number of 
industries (potentially with balance sheets under pressure) while diffusing the environmental 
benefits. Demand-side measures, conversely, concentrate the benefits at first (e.g. subsidies to 
bring down technology costs) while diffusing the fiscal costs.22 
The crisis will also provide an involuntary natural experiment in ‘degrowth’ as a climate 
strategy. Emissions will go down, potentially significantly, but significantly more tonnes of CO2 
will continue to be emitted in spite of large-scale economic output reduction and disruption 
across society. Rather, the transformation towards climate-neutrality requires ‘degrowth’ only 
in carbon-intensive activities, and rapid growth and scaling-up of more climate-neutral 
alternatives. Once the pandemic passes, the temporary impacts may quickly be 
overcompensated by the need to ‘recover’ lost time and to introduce incentives to spur 
demand to save suppliers in distress.  
Longer term, the link between temperature increases and pandemics and infectious disease 
demands more research attention (and funding). The IPCC in its special report on the 1.5° C 
target states with “high confidence” that the transmission of infectious disease is affected by 
higher temperatures, but the effect can be in either direction depending on the disease. Future 
research should particularly target the risks of increased transmission diseases with high 
infectiousness, and therefore systemic risk.23 
Implications beyond the EU borders  
One of the implications may be that COP26 to be held in Glasgow in November 2020 may need 
to be postponed or at least adapted. Such a decision is up to the countries represented at the 
UNFCCC. Irrespective of the public health perspective, preparatory meetings at the UNFCCC 
may be or have been cancelled, leading to delays of various negotiation tracks. COP26 has been 
 
20 See also the Letter of Eurogroup President Centeno of 24 March 2020, which talks about a symmetric shock 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/03/25/letter-of-eurogroup-president-mario-
centeno-to-the-president-of-the-european-council-following-the-eurogroup-of-24-march-2020/ 
21 https://www.ceps.eu/financing-europes-green-deal-beware-of-the-waterbed-effect/ 
22 This political economy argument is further discussed in Elkerbout, M. (2020). The Changing Role of Carbon 
Pricing in the EU. National Institute Economic Review No 251, Feb 2020. It builds on the work of Emil Dimanchev 
at MIT. 
23 See A Pandemic Foretold” https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/chronicle-of-a-pandemic-foretold/ 
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meant to lead to a global upgrade in climate commitments, requiring high-level political 
commitment. However, in the context of the pandemic, governments may not have the 
bandwidth to engage with international climate policy at a sufficiently senior level. Moreover, 
some actions agreed in the Paris Agreement should be implemented by the end of 2020 and 
do not depend on the COP26 as such. This includes updating nationally determined 
contributions (which remain a wholly domestic sovereign decision) and international climate 
finance commitments.  
With regard to Brexit, the transition period might need to be extended. No European economy 
should risk the potential increased disruption after 31 December 2020 that might ensue if there 
is no new EU-UK trade agreement in place. Nor is there enough time to negotiate specific joint 
climate institutions, such as linked emissions trading systems. 
The economic situation is further complicated by the falling oil prices, with Brent trading below 
$25 per barrel for the first time since the early 2000s. This was caused by the combined impact 
of a price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia following a breakdown in OPEC+24 negotiations 
and the decreased demand caused as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Normally, such a 
situation would have a negative effect on low-carbon investments and on the appetite for 
investments for increasing energy efficiency. On the other hand, the relative returns on 
investment for low-carbon investments may increase, irrespective of who finances the 
investment. Nonetheless, unlike previous plunges in the price of oil, such as in 2014, the 
situation may play out differently. Decarbonised solutions are now more readily available at 
lower costs in the EU, long-term plans of automakers are unlikely to be changed according to 
these lower fuel costs given the requirements of existing EU legislation, and more ambitious 
EU and global targets provide certainty for investors about the commitment to decarbonisation 
(and can continue to do so even during economically uncertain times). Nonetheless, low oil 
prices may also extend the usage of existing assets, such as internal combustion vehicles, 
therefore depressing the replacement rate. Meanwhile, persistent low oil prices will likely 
undermine the pursuit of any meaningful climate agenda in countries whose budgets are 
dominated by oil revenues. 
Outlook  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal was created in response to a then unprecedented 
economic crisis in the US. The current crisis is not driven by climate change, but the European 
Green Deal could nevertheless support the recovery. Moreover, if the recovery is implemented 
properly, the economic recovery has the potential to assist the low-carbon transition. The crisis 
may actually offer a unique opportunity for the EU to live up to the Green Deal’s promise of 
economic modernisation along the Paris decarbonisation objectives, allowing for a rethink of 
 
24 OPEC+ is an informal group of 24 oil-exporting countries. Its membership consists of the 14 members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) and 10 other countries, including most notably Russia. 
Together, these countries represent roughly half of the global oil production and try to coordinate the quantity of 
oil they supply in order to influence prices. 
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national taxation, innovation, infrastructure, entrepreneurship or the reform of the common 
agricultural policy.  
At this stage, it is too early to discuss the exact steps to make this happen. The important point 
however is to make low-carbon content in energy and materials both in the short and long-
term a guiding principle for the recovery. We should also not forget that for the recovery to 
happen will require addressing the generally weak balance sheets of companies, that will be 
one outcome of the crisis. This is a major deterrent to private investments.  
The current crisis may hold a lesson for climate change. Climate change is like a pandemic in 
slow motion; once our systems are ‘overwhelmed’, the impacts are likely to be unprecedented. 
The ‘recovery’ will also be in slow motion, because equivalents to containment (mitigation)25 
and building of intensive care units (adaptation) will have to operate over decades to bring 
greenhouse gases to levels more suitable for achieving the aim of a more stable socio-economic 
and environmental status. In both cases, the flow and its growth rate need to be tackled 
urgently so that concentrations do not lead to tipping points and other severe societal impacts. 
Finally, the pandemic shows that acting early prevents far greater costs down the line.  
Key points: 
• Even if GHG emissions will decline in the short term, the Corona crisis risks having a negative 
impact on EU and global emissions trends unless climate neutrality is an explicit criterion of 
the economic recovery programmes. Climate change will not disappear after the crisis.  
• The crisis will require the EU to think big. This provides an opportunity to go beyond the 
incrementalism that has characterised climate policy to date. Possible areas for 
transformational approaches are the creation of low-carbon lead markets (as for example 
outlined in the European Commission’s New Industrial Strategy for Europe), the kick-start 
of the hydrogen economy or a focus on the basic material value chain, which is responsible 
for half of global GHG emissions. 
• At the same time, the EU will need to remind itself on the value of carbon pricing and the 
EU ETS. In a period where there will be a lot of competition for fiscal resources, carbon 
pricing may become ever more important; it will be crucial to guide the recovery in a 
climate-friendly way while giving appropriate long-term price signals.  
 
25 The language of the pandemic response and climate change policy sometimes show similarities. See also this 
CEPS Policy Contribution “A Pandemic Foretold” https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/chronicle-of-a-
pandemic-foretold/ 
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